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I. Introduction r HEORETICAL work by
suggests that in the absence of tax distortions, borrowing constraints, and transactions costs, the decision to own a home is driven by the divergence between the investment (HI) and consumption (Hc) demands for housing (see also Fu (1991) ). Specifically, families live in owner-occupied housing if HI exceeds Hc, where HI reflects portfolio motives and HC reflects preferences for housing services.1 Previous empirical studies of housing demand and tenure choice, however, fail to distinguish HI from Hc, or to model the linkage between HI, Hc, and housing tenure.2 This paper estimates a model which separately identifies HI and Hc by simultaneously distinguishing four housing "subtenures." Families can rent without owning property (Rentl), rent while owning property other than their home (Rent2), own their home without owning other properties (Ownl), or own their home in addition to other properties (Own2). Provided the assumptions underlying the Henderson and loannides (1983) model are met, choice of housing subtenure is based on an index (J) equal to the excess of the investment demand over the consumption demand for housing, HI and Hc. As J exceeds a series of thresholds, families successively change subtenures from Rentl to Own2. In addition, for Own2 households, HI and Hc, in principle, can be observed since Hc is the principal residence, while HI equals total property holdings (including the principal residence). Hence, a maximum likelihood model can be specified which simultaneously identifies the threshold values and the determinants of both HI and Hc (even though 128 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS HI and Hc are not observed for some households). This model can also be generalized to allow for the effect of tax distortions and the like by omitting the distinction between Rentl and Rent2 families and focusing on the divergence that would arise between HI and Hc when families face the budget space enjoyed by owneroccupiers (in a manner to be clarified below).
The study is based on the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) which includes detailed information on the household's balance sheet and socio-demographic characteristics, and allows us to divide households into the housing subtenures noted above. Our results confirm that for owner-occupiers the consumption demand for housing differs from investment demand. We show that HI is more sensitive to wealth and income than is Hc, but that Hc is more sensitive to age, education, family size, and proximity to urban suburbs. In addition, test results indicate that the value of the principal residence of most owner-occupiers is determined by their consumption demand for housing, not their investment demand. Hence, previous empirical housing demand studies likely have identified the consumption demand for housing. Our findings also provide support for the divergence between HI and Hc as an important determinant of housing tensure status.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section describes the underlying behavioral model, section III describes the empirical framework and tests of the model structure, section IV presents the data, section V presents our results, and section VI is reserved for concluding comments.
II. The Behavioral Model
Housing stock is assumed to be homogeneous and may be owned for investment purposes, or owned and occupied, thus being used for both consumption and investment purposes. Household i has a consumption demand for housing stock (derived from the consumption demand for housing services), and an investment demand for housing stock based on portfolio motives, Hci = Hc(Xi, eci) and H1i = H1(Xi, e1i), respectively.3 X is a vector of explanatory variables (defined, for simplicity, as the union of all determinants of the elements common to both the investment and consumption functions), while eci and eii are random errors which may be correlated (since Hc and HI are jointly determined from a life cycle model). Hc is restricted to be positive by the behavior model, while HI is nonnegative under the assumption that short holdings of housing stock are not allowed. Henderson and loannides (1983) propose that in the absence of tax distortions, borrowing constraints, and transactions costs, the decision to rent versus to own may be viewed in terms of the divergence between the desired amount of housing stock for consumption and for investment purposes. If Hc is sufficiently larger than HI, a household is better off renting. If Hc exceeds HI by only a small amount, families which are good at maintaining their property may distort their investment demand and own Hc. By doing so, such families avoid externalities in the rental market which cause households with a predisposition to take good care of a rental property to implicitly subsidize the rental cost of other households.4 Similarly, if a household's investment demand exceeds consumption demand, that household is better off owner-occupying an amount of housing stock equal to Hc and holding for portfolio purposes additional property equal to HIHc.
The arguments above suggest that in the absence of transactions costs and institutional constraints, the principal residence of owneroccupants is determined primarily by their consumption demand (regardless of whether HI is less than or greater than H). Suppose, however, that there are lump sum costs associated with the purchase of real estate, or institutional constraints that restrict the minimum size of properties which can be purchased. If HI exceeds Hc by a small amount (relative to the lump sum 3Henderson and loannides (1983) show that both HI and HC are generated from the family's lifetime utility maximization problem. HI, in particular, satisfies the usual portfolio condition of equating risk adjusted rates of return across assets. 4Henderson and loannides (1983) argue that because of limited information, landlords cannot distinguish, ex ante, good tenants from bad tenants. Under such circumstances, landlords charge rents which reflect average maintenance costs across potential tenants. It follows that tenants who have a predisposition to maintain their home pay rents which exceed the marginal costs they impose on landlords. The reverse holds for tenants which tend not to maintain their residence. Figure 1 clarifies these arguments. The horizontal axis indicates X (the systematic determinants of HI and Hc), which is defined such that an increase in X leads to an increase in both the investment and consumption demands, respectively, while the vertical axis indicates housing stock.S In the region Rent 1, observe that Hc exceeds HI. In addition, we assume that investment demand is sufficiently low that families do not want to hold real estate in portfolio (either because households cannot go short in real estate or because transactions costs outweigh the benefit of holding property). The household, therefore, rents Hc and holds no housing for investment purposes. In the region Rent2, a household still rents Hc but also holds housing stock in its portfolio, H,. In the region Ownl, households find it advantageous to owner-occupy an amount of housing stock which is possibly different from either the consumption demand or the investment demand. Finally, in the region Own2, a household owner-occupies an amount of housing equal to its consumption demand, Hc, and holds an additional amount of housing stock in portfolio equal to the difference between HI and Hc.
CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT DEMANDS FOR HOUSING
Define the difference between HI and Hc as J, and a1, a2, and a3 as the set of critical values for J which determine transition from Rentl to Rent2, Rent2 to Ownl, and Ownl to Own2, respectively (as in figure 1 ). Observe that a1 < a2 < a3 (consistent with arguments above), which says that as the difference between the investment and consumption demands for housing increases, households switch successively from housing "subtenure" Rentl to Own2. In addition, if households rent only when Hc exceeds HI, a1 and a2 would be negative, while a3 would be positive if families own only when HI is greater than or equal to Hc.
Tax Incentives, Borrowing Constraints, and Transactions Costs
Suppose now that favorable tax treatment and transactions costs cause the rate of return on owner-occupied housing to differ from the rate of return on real estate holdings other than the principle residence.6 In addition, suppose that such effects influence the willingness of lenders to finance a family's principal residence versus other real estate investments. Then the household's budget constraint and real estate investment opportunities will differ depending on whether families rent their principal residence or become owner-occupiers. This is in contrast to the model above which implicitly assumes that renters and owner-occupiers face the same budget constraint and investment opportunities.
Under these conditions the divergence between HI and Hc-as determined based on the budget constraint of owner-occupiers-would not be a good predictor of whether renters do or do not own real estate because the Rentl/Rent2 sub-S Figure 1 is drawn with X on the horizontal axis to help clarify the intuition behind our model of housing subtenure choice. We should emphasize, however, that housing subtenure choice does not depend on individual elements of X, but instead relies on the divergence between HI and Hc. A precise algebraic description of the arguments above as they relate to our empirical model is given in expression (4.1-4.4) in the following section. 6 Homeowners, for example, are not taxed on imputed rent in contrast to landlords. Also, the transactions costs of selling an owner-occupied home are substantially higher than for other real estate holdings since homeowners must move when they sell their homes.
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tenure decision is based on a different set of budget conditions. On the other hand, note that the budget constraint and investment opportunities of Ownl and Own2 families are similar since both groups own their principal residence. Consider then the divergence between HI and Hc, where HI and Hc are determined based on the budget constraint of owner-occupiers. If HI is sufficiently less than Hc, then as before families would choose to rent since the level of owneroccupied housing required to satisfy the family's consumption needs would constitute a bad investment. Similarly, if HI exceeds Hc by a small amount families would own only their principal residence (Ownl), while if H1 exceeds Hc by a large amount families would own both their principal home and additional real estate (Own2). Hence, allowing for tax effects, borrowing constraints, and transactions costs, the divergence between HI and Hc-based on the budget constraint of owner-occupiers-determines whether families choose to become renters, Ownl, or Own2 households.7
III. The Econometric Model
Consider first the case when the budget space of owner-occupiers and renters is similar. Then the ordinal ranking of housing subtenure based on the difference between the investment (HI) and consumption (Hc) demands for housing (denoted by J) suggests that an ordered discrete choice model could be used to evaluate choice of housing subtenure. In addition, because J itself is the difference between HI and Hc, and HI and Hc are directly observed for the subsample consisting of Own2 households, in principle, a maximum likelihood model could be estimated which identifies the investment and consumption functions while simultaneously determining housing subtenure. Consider now the case in which the budget spaces of owner-occupiers and renters differ because of tax advantages, borrowing constraints, and transactions costs. As discussed earlier, under those conditions, the divergence between HI and Hc-given the budget space of owneroccupiers-determines whether families become renters, Ownl, or Own2 households. Accordingly, a three-celled ordered probit model can be estimated to evaluate the choice of Rent, Ownl, and Own2, results from which can be compared to estimates from the separate Own2 and Own (Ownl or Own2) probit models defined by expressions (6.3) and (6.2).
It is also desirable to identify the investment and consumption demands for housing, and to compare these functions to the housing decisions of Ownl families (referred to as the "mixed" demand function) and to a regression based on the principal residence of all owner-occupiers as estimated in previous studies (referred to as the "traditional" demand function). Consistent estimation of each of these functions may be based on traditional 2-step methods designed to control for selection effects. Given that both HI and Hc are observed only for Own2 households, a Mills ratio is constructed based on the Own2 probit model ((6.3)). The Mills ratio is then included in second stage ordinary least squares regressions of (1) and (2) using only Own2 families (correcting standard errors for selection effects).9 An analogous procedure is used to estimate the mixed and Finally, observe that under the null hypothesis that (4.1-4.4) correctly characterize housing subtenure choice, estimates of the covariance parameters P, ac, and o-c (obtained from the investment and consumption functions) can be used to obtain an initial consistent estimate of o-w as (o-2 + oc2 -2o-C)19/2. By maximum likelihood estimation according to (5) we can then obtain initial consistent estimates of a,, a2, and a3. In principle, these initial consistent estimates could be used as starting values in a likelihood function which simultaneously identifies HI, Hc, and housing subtenure choice. Unfortunately, the likelihood function for the complete model, presented in appendix A, did not converge regardless of whether families were allowed to choose between three or four housing subtenures (a possible explanation for this result is provided later in the paper).
IV. Data and Variables
The main data source for the study is the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) which contains 4303 households. From these households we excluded any observations with relevant missing values, families with wealth over one million dollars (1983 dollars) and households which belong to the high income subsample in the SCF (Avery and Elliehausen (1988)). The remaining sample of 3,569 households is representative of United States households in 1983. Variable definitions and summary statistics for the data used in the analysis are provided in appendix B.
A key strength of the 1983 SCF which makes it uniquely suitable for the present study is the tremendous detail provided on the household's balance sheet, including information about whether families own property other than their principal residence. That detail makes it possible to split families into the four subtenures, Rentl, Rent2, Ownl, and Own2, as defined earlier. Log of the house value of the principal residence was then used as the dependent variable in the housing consumption, Ownl ("mixed"), and "traditional" demand functions, while log of the total value of all real estate holdings (including the principal residence) was the dependent variable for the investment function.
Turning to the explanatory variables in the model, results from Henderson and loannides (1983) in conjunction with Fu (1991) suggest that, a priori, wealth has an ambiguous effect on housing tenure preferences (where wealth is formed here as the difference between non-pension assets and debt).1" Note also, that housing subtenure status could influence the observed level of wealth held by a family, particularly given the rapid increase in home prices just prior to our sample period. To control for possible simultaneity effects, wealth (in $100,000 units) is regressed on all of the exogenous variables in the model as 10 We also estimated Ownl housing consumption directly by controlling for selection effects through a first stage probit model on Ownl. Test results comparing the Ownl housing function to the Own2 consumption function are essentially identical to those obtained based on the procedure described above and are presented later in the paper. We should note, however, that under the null that (4.1-4.4) are correct, although the "traditional" selection model can be based on a probit model (of whether families own or rent), the probability of observing an Ownl family should not be estimated by probit since the underlying error term has a doubly truncated normal distribution. Under the alternative, that (4.1-4.4) are not correct, in principle both the Ownl and traditional probit based selection models could be acceptable. Nevertheless, the test procedure described in the text is more robust than the Ownl selection model and is preferred for that reason. Apart from wealth, most of the variables commonly used in housing demand and tenure choice studies are included in the model. The log of total current household pretax income (LINC) measured in $100,000 units was included, and proxies both the effect of income on preferences as well as tax effects.13 Tax-related price effects were further proxied by the log of the household's Federal marginal income tax rate (LMT).14 The relative cost of owning to renting may also vary across households because of regional differences in expected capital gains. These effects were proxied using county-wide data from the 1980 decennial census. For each household in our sample we formed the county-wide ratio of the median house value of owners to the median monthly rent of renters; the log of that ratio (LHVRNT) is entered in the model. In general, one would expect LHVRNT to be larger in regions with higher expected housing price inflation, as expected capital gains are capitalized into higher house values but reduce equilibrium rental rates.
Under the assumption that housing prices vary with population density and size, price effects are further captured by a series of 1-0 dummy variables which describe proximity to densely populated areas. Results from the 4-celled ordered probit, 3-celled ordered probit, Rentl, Own (Ownl + Own2), and Own2 probit models are presented in 12 We also estimated the entire model setting WHAT equal to log[abs(w')] for all families and including a second regressor, Neg -log[abs(w')] to control for observations with negative fitted wealth values (where Neg equals 1 if wi is negative and 0 otherwise). Results from both methods were quite similar causing us to favor the simpler procedure described above. 13 Federal tax laws allow homeowners to deduct mortgage interest and property tax payments (although maintenance expenses are not deductible), while imputed rent is not taxed (see Rosen (1979) , for example). The value of these tax provisions is sensitive to income through the marginal income tax rate.
Marginal income tax rates (MT) were obtained by first running regressions using a random sample of U.S. income tax returns obtained from the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) to determine taxable income in tax year 1982 based on variables common both to the 1982 IRS and 1983 SCF data (which pertain to 1982 household income). Coefficients from the IRS regressions were then used to predict 1982 taxable income for each family in the sample and marginal tax rates were determined based on the tax tables for 1982 and the family's tax status. For families with zero values for MT, MT was set equal to 0.01 when taking logs for LMT. In contrast to this procedure, most previous studies using the SCF data ignore marginal income tax rates because the SCF does not report reliable measures of MT. figure 1) as wealth and income increase. Although the marginal income tax rate is not significant, the relative cost of owning to renting (proxied by LHVRNT) appears to have a negative and significant effect on the model. Hence, in areas where it is relatively expensive to own, families are more likely to be in a lower subtenure (i.e., closer to Rent]). Older families (AGE), families with more education (ED = 1), female headed families (SEX = 0), white households (RACE = 0), married families (MARR = 1), and larger households (HSIZE), all are significantly more likely to choose higher subtenure status. A similar finding holds for families that have been on their current job longer (CUREMP) and families that have not recently received welfare payments (WELFARE = 0). Interestingly, the location dummy coefficients suggest that as families reside in more densely populated areas, ceteris paribus, they are more likely to choose a lower subtenure classification; the one exception is the FARSUB zone which has a positive effect on subtenure choice relative to rural areas (the omitted category).16
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Apart from the actual coefficient values in the ordered probit models (which generally seem plausible), as noted above, casual inspection across the models in table 1 shows a striking degree of similarity in coefficient values for nearly all of the regressors except for those of column Own2. In addition, in tables 2a and 2b note that the patterns of predicted subtenures based on the ordered probit models are nearly identical to the patterns of predicted subtenures based on the separate "non-ordered" probit models. These findings suggest that the excess of investment (HI) over consumption (Hc) demand for housing is both a good predictor and an important determinant of housing subtenure choice.
At the same time, however, observe that the Hausman test statistics (reported at the bottom of table 1) reject the null that the coefficients in the 4-and 3-celled ordered probit models are equal to those of the non-ordered probit models. Hence, based on the more exacting Hausman test, it appears that factors other than the divergence between HI and Hc also influence housing subtenure choice. One possible explanation is that tax effects, borrowing constraints, and transactions costs affect housing subtenure choice in a more complicated manner than allowed in the 16 Note, for instance, that the coefficient on CCBIG is substantially less than coefficients on CCOTHER and SUB-BIG (which have similar coefficients). Similarly, the coefficients on CCOTHER and SUBBIG are smaller than the coefficient on SUBOTHER which is smaller than the coefficient on FARSUB. Note: Values indicate the number of individuals in each combination of actual and predicted subtenure class, where the predicted subtenure for a given individual is the subtenure with the highest choice probability. ordered probit models. Another possibility is that housing tenure could enter directly into the household's utility function.17
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As discussed earlier, in principle two step methods can be used to estimate the investment and consumption demand functions based on OWN2 households controlling for selection effects. Similarly, the "mixed" and "traditional" demand functions can be estimated using OWN1 families and all owner-occupiers (OWN] plus OWN2), respectively, also controlling for selection effects. In practice, however, if the deviation between HI and HC is the principal determinant of housing subtenure choice, then there is no theoretical basis for including variables in the first stage probit models that do not otherwise appear in the demand functions. Under these conditions, identification of the Mills ratio terms in the demand functions relies on the nonlinearity of the probit models. This is problematic, however, because the true degree of nonlinearity in the demand functions is itself unknown. 18 These problems may account for why the Mills ratio terms in all of the demand functions (investment, consumption, mixed, and traditional) were insignificant and had little effect on the other coefficients in the models. (as in most housing demand studies). In addition, the absence of exclusion restrictions could explain why the full maximum likelihood model described in appendix A failed to converge. Accordingly, to conserve space table 3 presents results only from the OLS demand functions even though the OLS models may suffer from sample selection effects (two-step results are provided in loannides and Rosenthal (1991)).19
In table 3 observe that X2 tests soundly reject the null that the coefficients in the investment (HI) and consumption (Hc) functions are alike which indicates that HI and Hc do in general deviate from one another.20 Additional X2 tests fail to reject the null that the coefficients in the mixed function differ from either the consumption function or the traditional demand function.21 These findings suggest that Own] housing levels are determined primarily by the consumption demand for housing, not portfolio motives. An important implication of this result is that previous empirical studies of housing demand likely have identified the consumption demand for housing since those studies estimate the traditional demand function.
Given these test results, a comparison of the investment and consumption functions is most 17A different explanation is that the large sample size used in calculating the Hausman test causes even small differences across models to appear statistically significant. However, careful review of table 1 reveals sizable differences between estimates from the OWN2 model and the other probit models. 18 This problem, of course, is not unique to this study but is endemic to all housing demand studies (see Rosen (1979 Rosen ( , 1985 , for example). 19 Relative to the estimates in table 3, the principal effect of including the Mills ratios was to increase the standard errors on the other coefficients but not enough to change the nature of our findings. 20 The relevant test statistic equals 350.24 compared to a critical value (at the 5% level) of 31.4. 21 The test statistic comparing the "mixed" and "traditional" demand functions equals 16.33 compared to a critical value (at the 5% level) of 31.4. 
accurately obtained based on the traditional demand function (since the traditional function uses more data than the Own2 consumption and Own] mixed functions and is, therefore, more efficient). Comparing the investment and traditional functions, note that, although both increase with wealth and income, investment demand is more sensitive to changes in these variables. In addition, wealth and income are both significant in the investment function, while only income is significant in the consumption equation. In contrast, age, education, and household size (HSIZE) all have positive and significant effects on the consumption demand for housing, but have smaller and generally not significant coefficients in the investment model. Race effects across the two models appear to be similar, as are price effects as proxied by LMT and LHVRNT. Location further proxies price effects (by reflecting regional differences in housing prices), but proximity to different urban zones appears to have little effect on investment demand, which may reflect that real estate investment is not necessarily tied to a family's immediate area of residence. In contrast, consumption demand apparently is sensitive to location, as suggested by the positive and significant coefficient on SUBBIG and the negative and (marginally) significant coefficient on FARSUB.22
VI. Conclusions
Theoretical work by Henderson and loannides (1983) suggests that in the absence of tax distortions, borrowing constraints, and transactions costs, the decision to own a home is driven by the divergence between the investment (HI) and consumption (Hc) demands for housing (see also Fu (1991) If the divergence between HI and Hc is the sole determinant of housing subtenure choice, then a series of separate non-ordered probit models for different subtenure classifications yield consistent but inefficient estimates of the model parameters. On the one hand, the non-ordered probit models yield a set of estimated coefficients and pattern of predicted subtenures that is remarkably close to the ordered probit models. This finding confirms that the excess of investment over consumption demand for housing is an important determinant of housing subtenure choice. However, a more exacting Hausman test rejects the structure implied by the ordered probit model which indicates that factors other than the divergence between HI and Hc also affect housing subtenure. One possible explanation for this finding could be that housing tenure status enters directly into household utility functions. Another possibility is that tax effects, borrowing constraints, and transactions costs affect housing subtenure choice in a more complicated manner than allowed for in the ordered probit models.
A second important contribution of this paper is that we separately identify the housing investment and consumption demand functions by focusing on households that own both their principal residence and additional real estate. Regression results confirm that the investment and consumption demands for housing differ. Specifically, the investment demand for housing is more sensitive to wealth and income than is the consumption demand for housing, but consumption demand is more sensitive to demographic variables like age, education, and family size, as well as proximity to urban centers. Test results also 22 Although receiving welfare payments appears to have a much stronger negative effect on consumption demand than on investment demand, the insignificant coefficient of WEL-FARE in the investment model could reflect the relatively small number of Own2 families that receive welfare (which would make it difficult to identify the corresponding coefficient). strongly indicate that the residence of most owner-occupiers is determined primarily by their consumption demand for housing, not their investment demand. An important implication of this result is that previous empirical studies of housing demand likely have identified the consumption demand for housing given that those studies typically do not distinguish between housing investment and consumption. 
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